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NO-FAULT MEDICAL INJURY
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MICHAEL FOSTER*

A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION. By Paul C. Weiler,

Howard H. Haitt, Joseph P. Newhouse, William G. Johnson,
Troyen A Brennan, and Lucian L. Leape. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1993. Pp. xiv, 175.

INTRODUCTION

In 1984 a group of physicians, law professors, and researchers
from Harvard University began exploring the array of problems
associated with medical injuries and malpractice litigation, and
considering proposals for reforming the current tort system (p.
vii). When the Harvard Medical Practice Study Group began its
exploration, the only other major study on the incidence of medical
injuries was one completed in California in the mid-1970s (p. viii).
Although considered ground breaking, the California study failed
to address some of the major problems in the area and was
deemed to have limited value in the current debate on malpractice
litigation and reform (p. viii). The Harvard group formulated a
plan for a more comprehensive study to confront the major facets
of the malpractice debate: the nature and incidence of medical in* B.A. 1962, University of Tampa, J.D. 1965, Stetson University College of Law.
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juries, patient losses and the degree to which such losses are compensated from nontort sources, the practical availability of the
tort system to injured patients, and the impact of malpractice litigation on physician behavior, including the extent to which such
litigation deters patient injury (p. viii).
The Harvard group first offered its proposal to state officials
in Massachusetts but received a tepid response (pp. viii-ix). At the
time, the Massachusetts Legislature was debating the merits of
medical malpractice damage caps, stricter disciplinary measures
for doctors, and various other tort reform proposals (p. ix). Consequently, the proposal was rejected for fear that it might derail the
legislative process then underway (p. ix).
The State of New York, however, was receptive to the
Harvard group's proposal. In 1986, with the support of Governor
Mario M. Cuomo's Commissioner of Health, Dr. David Axelrod,
the Harvard group was commissioned to conduct a three-year
study at a cost of approximately four million dollars (p. ix). The
group endeavored to determine the number of patients injured in
hospitals, the proportion of those injuries that were caused by
negligence, the number of patients who brought lawsuits, and the
extent to which the lawsuits had merit (p. ix). Further, the
Harvard group sought to determine the extent of financial loss
suffered by the injured patients, the sufficiency of "alternative
sources of compensation," and the deterrent effect of malpractice
litigation on doctors' professional behavior and on the risk of injury to patients (p. x).
The comprehensive nature of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study required that the researchers amass and analyze a staggering amount of information. As a result, the study took six years to
complete. In order to ensure an accurate statistical representation, the researchers reviewed 30,000 patients' hospital records
from fifty-one acute-care nonpsychiatric hospitals (p. x). They also
interviewed 2500 patients and surveyed 1000 doctors. Lastly,
they analyzed and reviewed the files relating to nearly 70,000
medical malpractice claims made in the State of New York between 1975 and 1989.1 A Measure of Malpractice:Medical Injury,
1 The authors note that the information required for the study could only be gathered with the assistance of the participating hospitals and staff (p. x). The cooperation of the hospitals and staff was secured by promises that no patient would be advised that an injury had occurred or had resulted from negligence (p. xi). Without
such a guarantee, the group felt certain that the hospitals would have denied access
to their records (p. xi). On the other hand, extending these confidentiality guarantees
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Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation summarizes
the Harvard group's findings and proposals, and its justifications
for the reforms suggested.
Parts I through VII of this review critically examine the
book's conclusions regarding the adoption of a no-fault system to
replace the present tort system. Part VIH examines the shortcomings of the no-fault system, and suggests that the medical malpractice crisis under the present tort system is not quite as critical
as the authors assert. Finally, although the learned authors of
this book will surely be called upon for their expertise in the
broader policy debate on health care, this review suggests that the
authors' no-fault system should not be adopted.

I. THE

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The authors maintain that the recent clash between the tort
system and the medical profession is, in part, the result of two
medical malpractice insurance premium crises in two decades and
the fear of a third such crisis (pp. 1-3). The skyrocketing premiums of the mid-70s and mid-80s were primarily responsible for
the birth of the so-called "tort reform movement" (pp. 2, 6-7).2
Furthermore, although the authors concede that erratic premiums
are primarily attributable to the special characteristics of liability
insurance, they assert that the long-term trend of inflated medical
malpractice premiums is the result of the steadily rising cost of
medical liability itself (pp. 3-4).
Two variables ultimately determine premium levels: claim
frequency and claim severity. "Claim frequency" refers to the
number of claims filed against health care providers in a given
period of time while "claim severity" refers to the average payment made on successful claims. In the late 1950s, claim frequency was only one claim per 100 physicians per year, while in
the latter part of the 1980s more than ten claims per 100 physicians were filed each year. Similarly, the average payment per
to the hospitals raises ethical questions about patients' rights to full disclosure (p. xii).
The researchers' concern about the ethical implications of the guarantees was eased,

however, when the Human Subjects Committee of the Harvard School of Public
Health approved the practice of concealing information from study subjects (p. xiii).
2 In the mid-1970s the first malpractice crisis resulted in the doubling of insurance premiums in three years. In the aftermath of a legislative stabilization effort
premiums leveled off, but a second crisis arose in the 1980s causing a second doubling
of insurance premiums within a three year period (p. 3).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:727

successful claim increased from $40,000 in 1970 (adjusted to 1990
values) to almost $150,000 by the end of the 1980s (p. 4).
The special characteristic of medical malpractice insurance
that helped to send medical malpractice premiums spiralling upward, in contrast to other types of liability insurance, is, as the
authors referred to it, the longer "tail" of medical malpractice insurance coverage (pp. 4-5). This tail represents the length of time
between an injury, the filing of a claim, and the claim's disposition. This tail forced insurance carriers to use premiums paid in
later years to defend claims that had been incurred years earlier.
Losses were therefore higher than the insurers had forecasted,
which necessitated the increase of premiums to cover the
shortfall.
The insurance industry responded to this perceived malpractice crisis with a three-pronged plan: changes in the liability insurance system, "tort reform," and improvements in the quality of
health care. The liability insurance system authorized insurance
companies to begin writing "claims made" coverage policies instead of the usual "occurrence" policies (p. 7). The claims made
coverage protected physicians for the period in which the claims
were made irrespective of when the treatment was rendered or
when the injury occurred. These new policies made it easier for
insurers to formulate a premium payment schedule that more accurately forecasted the time claim payout was required, thereby
eliminating the underwriting problems caused by delayed claims
(p. 7). Furthermore, patient compensation funds were created to
relieve the burden on individual doctors by requiring the hospital
where an injury occurred to "channel" the personal liability of the
doctor through the institution's insurance policy (p. 8).' In order
to fill the void created by insurance companies that had fled the
market, companies owned by and insuring only physicians, socalled "bedpan mutuals," and joint underwriting associations were
created (p. 7). Additionally, two states now require merit rating of
malpractice insurance so that doctors with higher rates of claims
asserted against them or paid on their behalf will pay higher premiums (p. 10).
3 "In the nation as a whole, the median time from injury to claim is 13 months,
and from claim to payment 23 months, for a total of three years." (p. 5) (emphasis in

original).
4 These patient compensation funds are either maintained by all providers in the
state or by the state's taxpayers (p. 10).
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Reform of medical malpractice litigation was directed primarily at limiting claimants' access to the courts and appraising the
merits of an injured patient's legal claim on a legal standard of
care defined to be considerably more favorable to doctors than to
other tort defendants. To achieve these goals, fixed dollar caps
were set to limit the amount of an injured's award, and payment
of such damages were made over time, as the losses occurred.
Furthermore, payments were terminated if the injured did not
survive as long as was anticipated (pp. 8-9).' In addition, this
statutory reform included a shortening of statutes of limitations,
mandatory presuit screening, and a reduction of contingent fees
allowed to be charged by an attorney to pursue a claim with a
risky prospect for recovery.
To foster better quality health care, hospitals, health care organizations, and state health departments have been required to
adopt measures aimed at improving staff conduct and the monitoring of patient complaints (p. 10).
Against this background of rapid change and legislative experimentation, the Harvard group conducted its study and proposed alternatives to the then existing tort system. As evidenced
by available empirical studies completed prior to the Harvard
Medical Practice Study, many of the laws enacted to modify patient accessibility to the courts and the liability of health care
providers had a mere modest effect on lowering insurance premiums (p. 11).6 The authors maintain that the most effective measure for lowering premiums and costs was to cap damages (pp. 1011). This approach, however, shifts the burden of containing malpractice costs from doctors to the one class of individuals least
able to afford it, namely, the patients who suffer the most severe
injuries and, therefore, have the greatest financial needs (p. 11).
The authors contend that the most alarming problem with capping damage awards is that legislators have assumed that malpractice litigation is an evil without first balancing the benefits
provided to patients with the heavy burden malpractice litigation
places on the legal system (pp. 11-12).
5 New York does not allow an injured victim's award to be constrained by a monetary ceiling, but it does, however, "authoriz[e] judges to review and revise any award
that appear[s] to 'deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation for
the case.'" (p. 9).
6 But ef Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 49 LAw & CoNMAIP. PROB. 57 (1986) (noting that most tort reform legislation
has provided relief sought by medical profession and insurance industry).
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II. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE TORT SYSTEM
Professor Weiler and his colleagues evaluate the tort system's
effectiveness and its alternatives by comparing and contrasting
three major categories: compensation to injured victims, the expense of administering the system, and the system's effectiveness
in preventing future negligent medical care (pp. 14-19).
The authors contend that they properly avoided focusing
solely on the two major objectives of the tort system-loss shifting
to the culpable party, or "corrective justice," and the deterrence of
future negligence (pp. 15-16). Asserting that these objectives have
become more theoretical than real in today's medical malpractice
litigation, since insurance companies, and not doctors, inevitably
compensate injured patients, the authors maintain that their
analysis is the more pragmatic and appropriate approach to the
debate. The Harvard group focused on the way injured patients
are compensated and the economic effect of the tort system, as
well as its effectiveness in preventing substandard medical treatment so that all patients may be protected from medical malpractice injuries (pp. 16-19).
The tort system is perceived as arbitrary and unfair because
it is designed to compensate only those losses suffered by patients
who can prove that they have incurred iatrogenic injuries from
substandard medical care, while it neglects injured patients with
equal needs, whose injuries did not result, or cannot be proven to
have resulted, from medical malpractice (p. 16). The system is
further criticized as "incompatible with sound principles of loss insurance" since awards are granted for intangible damages, such
as pain and suffering, and loss of consortium (p. 16). Similarly,
the authors view the system as flawed because it permits "full replacement of all lost earnings or treatment costs without any application of the deductible or coinsurance formulas that are standard in both private and public insurance" (p. 16). This view is
outdated and simplistic. At the time of publication of this book
there were few, if any, states in this country without collateral
source set-off statutes covering benefits paid by insurance. The
authors also overlooked the need for requiring an injured patient
to prove negligence before any damages are recovered, and the
fact that a share of the patient's recovery goes to pay the contingent fee of plaintiff's counsel since in most malpractice cases
plaintiffs cannot recover attorney's fees from a negligent defendant (p. 16).
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The authors then attack the administrative burden imposed
by the tort system. They agree with other critics of the tort system that it is too expensive to administer since proving fault often
necessitates incurring the high costs associated with litigation.
They also attack the administration of the current tort system by
asserting that its reliability is hampered by jurors who are unable
to assess complex medical standards of care (p. 17). Although the
authors indicate their disdain for the abilities ofjurors throughout
the book, no empirical data are ever offered to justify their position. The need for expert witness testimony to guide lay jurors is
viewed as a primary cause of high administrative costs in medical
malpractice cases. Ironically, the authors concede that only approximately forty percent of the total administrative costs in malpractice claims ever reaches the patients to compensate them for
their injuries (p. 17).
Recognizing the viewpoints of critics of the tort system, the
authors suggest two reasons behind the system's failure to deter
future negligent medical care or improve the quality of medicine
(pp. 17-18). First, they state that the monetary "penalty" imposed
on a negligent doctor depends on the fortuitous occurrence and severity of the patient's injuries, rather than on the doctor's culpability.7 Second, they assert that the system actually encourages
unnecessary and wasteful modes of defensive medicine to reduce
the potential for the filing of a claim, rather than deterring the
incidence of iatrogenic injuries from occurring in the first instance
(pp. 17-19).
The authors offer two possible alternatives to "tort-fault liability": a "no-liability" approach or a "no-fault (or strict) liability"
option (p. 19). Advocates of the "no-liability" approach suggest doing away with tort liability and providing redress for injured patients through options similar to those that are available to victims of any other disabling injury resulting from causes other
than medical treatment. These advocates envision "considerably
improved systems of social insurance for medical costs and lost
earnings, and stiffer regulatory sanctions against risky behavior"
(p. 19). Alternatively, "no-fault (strict) liability" would entitle an
7 Under this approach, an extremely negligent doctor whose malpractice does not
cause serious injury may escape liability, while a doctor whose negligence causes
grave injury, even ifhe is generally a careful physician, may be held liable for millions
of dollars in tort damages, since an attorney is more likely to make the substantial
investment required to maintain an action against the physician (pp. 17-18).
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injured patient to compensation regardless of whether medical
malpractice was involved (p. 19). Such a system, which is favored
by Professor Weiler and his colleagues, would be fimded by medical accident insurance provided on a mandatory or volunteer basis
by private or public insurance carriers. Responsibility for adverse
consequences "would still be discharged through a special program devised and paid for within the health care system" (p. 19).
The authors believe that the no-fault plan would better compensate the victims of all medical injuries, as it eliminates the element of "luck" associated with attempting to prove medical malpractice (p. 20). Additionally, they state that the plan is "more in
accord with sound insurance principles" (p. 21) because, although
it would decrease compensation for lost earnings and intangible
damages, such as pain and suffering and loss of the capacity for
the enjoyment of life, the system would compensate all medical
injury victims, and not only those whose injuries were caused by
negligence (pp. 20-21).
The authors also speculate that the savings which could be
realized by eliminating the need to prove negligence could enable
a large amount of societal resources presently spent on lawyers,
expert witnesses, and court costs to be spent reimbursing injured
patients for their losses (p. 21). The only issues that would arise
under the proposed no-fault system would be whether the patient
had, in fact, suffered a medical injury and the extent to which
such injury should be compensated. The manner in which these
issues would be resolved, by whom, and why they would not be as
contentious as causation and damage claims in tort cases are not
topics the book examines in any detail.8
s Elsewhere, one of the book's authors has described in greater detail the administration he envisions for the no-fault system:
A mature system might function similarly to the system now existing in
Sweden. A patient who was medically injured would be assisted in filling
out a claims form by a social worker. An adjuster employed by the hospital's
liability insurer would review the claim. If it merited further attention, the
adjuster would confer with an insurance company physician, and they would
put together an offer for the patient that would be subject to approval by a
claims board at the company. If the patient did not find the offer acceptable,
she could appeal to an appeals board operated by the state ....
Further
appeal could then be made to an intermediate level state court, based on an
"arbitrary and capricious" standard.
Troyen A. Brennan, Improving the Quality of Medical Care: A CriticalEvaluation of
the MajorProposals,10 YALE L. & PoL'y REv. 431, 458 (1992). See generally MAULYN
M. ROSENTHAL, DEALING wITH MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE BRrrisH AND SWEDISH ExPERIENCE 174-83 (1988) (describing Swedish no-fault system in greater detail).
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Finally, the authors consider the no-fault system's ability to
deter future iatrogenic injuries, and thereby improve general
health care, slightly superior to the present tort system (pp. 2021). In addition to confining legal responsibility for injuries in the
medical care system, the proposed no-fault system would compensate patients' losses due to unavoidable iatrogenic injuries (p. 22).
The net effect of this coverage would provide "the health care system [with] a powerful incentive to develop innovative quality assurance techniques and equipment that would make it feasible to
avoid more and more of the medical accident toll" (p. 22).
Although the authors mention several problems critical to acceptance of their proposal, they do not persuasively resolve them
(pp. 22-32). First, the Medical Insurance Feasibility Study in California in the mid-1970s found a disabling injury risk rate of one
in every twenty hospital admissions.9 Because only a small fraction of those injuries ever resulted in actual tort recoveries, serious doubt arises over the way a no-fault plan could feasibly compensate all medical injuries without severely limiting the level of
compensation.' 0 Second, the authors concede that proponents of
no-fault are uncertain how "injuries," unexpected adverse events
that result from medical care (recoverable under no-fault), may be
successfully distinguished from those conditions that are the natural consequences of medical care (not recoverable under nofault). Thus, determining the extent to which a medical injury is
compensable may prove to be just as difficult to accomplish in the
no-fault context as it is in the current tort system. This possibility, coupled with the greater number of claims that no-fault would
entail, raises doubt about whether there would be sufficient savings in administration and litigation expenses to adequately fund
a no-fault plan (p. 24).
A third concern is the impact the no-fault scheme would have
on the incentives for safe treatment (pp. 24-25). The authors acknowledge that, although under a no-fault system all patient injuries would be covered, the damages awarded to patients who are
the victims of negligent treatment would undoubtedly be less than
those provided under the current tort system (p. 24). Thus, "the
financial incentive to avoid negligent incidents.., would be significantly reduced" (p. 24). In addition, under the proposed plan, in9 See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL INSURANCE FEAsmuirrY STUDY

(Donald H. Mills ed., 1977).
10 See id. A no-fault system could, in fact, increase insurance premiums. Id.
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surance would be provided and paid for by hospitals, clinics,
HMOs and other health care organizations, rather than the individual physicians who provide the treatment and cause the injury
(p. 24). Consequently, society would be stripped of a deterrent
mechanism for substandard medical care. More importantly,
under a no-fault plan there would be no trials to subject doctors
and hospitals to public scrutiny and promote safer treatment.
Ironically, even the patient's responsibility for exercising care in
following a treatment regimen might be reduced under no-fault,
since a guarantee of compensation might reduce a patient's tendency to exercise care with regard to his or her condition (p. 25).
While the tort system can be said to encourage the practice of defensive medicine, a no-fault system may actually increase this
practice, particularly with respect to hospitals. Hospitals could
potentially reduce their financial exposure to liability costs by refusing high risk patients (those whose treatment is most likely to
result in medical injury and a subsequent claim), leaving them
with limited treatment options (p. 25).
In the final analysis, the authors conclude that a no-fault
compensation plan is, or can be made, financially affordable (pp.
27-29). Although the authors acknowledge that insurance premiums could increase significantly under the Harvard group's proposed plan, they contend that there are ways to keep costs down.
For instance, limits could be placed on the extent of coverage by
accounting for alternative sources of compensation when determining how much of an injured patient's losses to compensate (p.
28). In addition, priority may be given to "the longer-lasting disabilities that affect far fewer patients but inflict severe or even catastrophic losses on the individual and family concerned," while
short-term disabilities and minor losses "can and should be covered by the victim's personal resources" (p. 29).
The authors claim that a no-fault liability system, if it functions like workers' compensation, should be preferable to malpractice litigation since in a workers' compensation system only
twenty percent of each dollar is applied to administration expenses, which is one-third of the comparable costs expended in
connection with medical malpractice cases.'1
The Harvard group concludes its comparison of the relative
merits of a tort-based system versus a no-fault plan by asserting
11 Later in the text, the authors concede that the savings enjoyed under a no-fault
system may not be as great as those enjoyed under workers' compensation (p. 106).
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that it began its work without an affirmative position on the superiority of one over the other (p. 149). Rather, the authors' primary
objective was to gather empirical data so that informed judgments
could be made about proposals for changing the tort system.
Although one may question the viability of their proposals for
change, the study results themselves are both fascinating and enlightening. The authors' efforts to gather useful information have
proven to be eminently successful.
III. THE INCIDENCE OF MEDICAL INJURY, ITS CAUSES
AND VICTRAS

The Harvard researchers had three stated objectives. First,
they wanted to obtain accurate information on the incidence and
pattern of medical injuries in New York hospitals and on the medical settings in which they occurred (p. 33). Second, they sought to
determine whether the tort system functioned effectively in compensating patients and deterring future injury. Finally, the authors needed information to achieve perhaps their "most important[] objective of helping to develop a comprehensive
methodology for preventing medical injury" (p. 33).
To achieve these goals, researchers reviewed 31,000 medical
records from patient admissions in fifty-one New York nonpsychiatric hospitals in 1984 to identify iatrogenic medical injuries (adverse events) and to determine if they were due to negligence. 2
The book defines adverse events as "the unintended or unexpected
harmful consequences of medical intervention... that prolonged
the hospitalization beyond the time required by the underlying illness and/or caused disability at the time of hospital discharge or
death" (p. 35). A negligent medical injury is defined as one resulting from care that did not meet "the standard of the average medical practitioner in the field" (p. 35).
To ensure the accuracy of its study, the Harvard group
trained medical record analysts to scrutinize all records for evidence of one or more of eighteen clinical criteria frequently associ12 The Harvard group deferred to the California study, a review of 20,000 medical
records conducted in 1974, as a model (pp. 33-34). The California study revealed that
an adverse event occurred in 4.65% of hospitalizations, roughly one for every 21 admissions (p. 36). The incidence of adverse events due to negligence was 0.79% of admissions, or one in 125. Of the total number of adverse events in California in 1974,
one in six was deemed caused by negligence (p. 36). While the study was considered
helpful, the authors modified its methodology by following a systematic, epidemiological approach to medical injury (pp. 33-34).
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ated with adverse outcomes, such as previous hospitalizations
within a year, transfers to an intensive care unit, or deaths during
hospitalization. 13 Records that failed the screening were then reviewed by two or more physicians, each of whom determined
whether a medical injury had occurred, and, if so, whether the injury was due to negligence and, finally, the degree of disability
caused by the injury (ranging from minimal to severe) (p. 37). To
increase the reliability of physician judgments, which are often
quite subjective, the Harvard researchers developed an adverse
event analysis form ("AEAF") to assure unbiased judgments.1 4
The doctors using the AEAFs were required to rank their confidence in the judgments they had made about causation and
negligence.
To verify the validity of the study's findings, a sampling of
hospital records was compared against tort claims files, on the assumption that the fies would serve as a basis for determining
whether information had been "concealed" in the hospital records.
More than eighty percent of the adverse events and nearly seventy-five percent of the negligent adverse events were found to
have been accurately identified from the hospital records alone. 15
The 31,000 medical records from which the researchers drew their
data came from a cross-section of nonpsychiatric hospitals, "stratifying on the basis of three hospital variables: type of ownership,
teaching status, and geographic region."1 6 From a review of
30,195 records, 1278 adverse events were discovered; negligence
caused 306 of these (p. 42). 17 Seventy percent of the patients who
13 See Henry H. Hiatt et al., A Study of Medical Injury and Medical Malpractice:
An Overview, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 480,483 (1989) (listing screening criteria utilized
by researchers in searching through hospital records for negligence and causation of
adverse events).
14 Instead of the physician-lawyers which had been used in the California study,
surgeons and internists were used to review the records for adverse events of negligence, thereby allowing the study to be used by health care institutions that had previously refused to rely on physician-attorneys for quality assessment (p. 38).
15 See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Reliability and Validity of Judgments Concerning Adverse Events Suffered by Hospitalized Patients, 27 MED. CARE 1148 (1989)
(describing methodology used by record reviewers in greater detail).
16 See Brennan, supra note 8, at 481. The stratification included samples from
teaching and nonteaching hospitals in both rural and urban settings, some of which
were privately owned and others which were governmentally funded (p. 40).
17 The Harvard group concluded that in New York in 1984, 3.7% of the patients
hospitalized suffered adverse events and 27.6% of those were due to negligence (p. 42).
See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence ofAdverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients:Results of the HarvardMedical PracticeStudy I, 321 Nnw ENG. J. MED.
431 (1991) (summarizing results of Harvard study).
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experienced adverse events incurred relatively short terms of disability. Based on study projections, approximately 3800 adverse
events statewide produced permanent impairment resulting in a
level of disability of up to fifty percent (p. 44). An additional 2500
patients suffered a severe or total disability and approximately
13,400 New York patients hospitalized in 1984 died as a direct
result of medical treatment, fifty-one percent of them due to negligence. One chilling conclusion of the study was that "[t]wo-thirds
of the injuries produced by grave negligence were fatal, six times
the mortality rate for non-negligent iatrogenic injuries" (p. 45).
The authors independently analyzed several different aspects
of the health care system to assess individual risk factors affecting
injury rates. One conclusion was that patients over the age of
sixty-five had an alarmingly high risk of sustaining medical injury
(p. 45). Another finding was that the percentage of adverse events
due to negligence was higher among African-American patients
and those with an income below the poverty level.-8 Also, uninsured patients suffered a greater risk of negligent care than patients with medicaid or private insurance (p. 47).19

Hence, the "major risk factors for receiving poor quality care"
(p. 47) were patient age and a lack of health insurance. Race, as a
determining factor, became less significant when more sensitive
methods were used to achieve greater statistical accuracy. Nevertheless, because African-Americans comprise such a high percentage of patients who lack health insurance coverage, they were
among the patient group
at greatest risk for medical injury and
20
negligent treatment.
The hospitals studied had a range of adverse events that varied from 0.2 percent to 7.9 percent of admissions, or an average of
3.2 percent (p. 47). The rates of adverse events caused by negligence, however, covered a far broader range, from a low of one
percent to a shocking high of sixty percent, for an average of 24.9
percent (p. 47). Three hospital characteristics tended to influence
18 Cf. Helen R. Burstin et al., Socioeconomic Status and Risk for Substandard
Medical Care, 268 JAMA 2383, 2385 (1992) (finding poor patients had significantly
higher adverse event and negligence rates than all other income groups).
19 See Joel S. Weissmann et al., Rates of Avoidable Hospitalizationby Insurance
Status in Massachusetts and Maryland,268 JAMA 2388, 2392 (1992) (stating uninsured patients have higher hospitalization rates than insured patients); cf Burstin,
supra note 18, at 2385 ("Payer status was not associated with significantdifferences
in adverse event rates.") (emphasis added).
20 See Burstin, supra note 18, at 2386-87 (summarizing study).
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the risk of medical injury. First, higher rates of medical injury
were found in university teaching hospitals than in affiliated
teaching or nonteaching hospitals (pp. 48-49).21 Second, urban

hospitals had more adverse events than hospitals in rural areas of
the state. Third, medium-sized hospitals had more adverse events
than larger-sized ones (pp. 49-51).
Negligent adverse events were significantly higher in hospitals with a high percentage of minority patient discharges. University teaching hospitals and proprietary hospitals had lower incidences of negligence than the others studied. Negligent adverse
event rates in hospitals with primarily minority admissions were
thirty-seven percent, and thirty-five percent in government hospitals, as compared with only 10.7 percent in university teaching
hospitals, and 9.5 percent in proprietary hospitals.2 2
Several medical specialties were also reviewed, and among
them the treatment of newborns by pediatricians enjoyed the lowest rate of medical injury (0.5 percent) while vascular surgery suffered the highest (16.1 percent). Further, surgeons had higher
rates of negligent medical injuries than internists (p. 53).
Although only three percent of adverse events occurred in the
emergency room, seventy percent of these were found to be due to
negligence. Despite having the highest rate of adverse events
(forty-eight percent), surgical treatment had a lower rate of negligence than nonsurgical adverse events (thirty-seven percent).
Only eight percent of the adverse events found were caused by
diagnostic errors, yet seventy-five percent of those errors were attributable to negligence.2" Furthermore, adverse events caused
by diagnostic work-ups posed a greater threat of serious traumatic
outcomes than did other nonsurgical adverse events. 24 A majority of the nonsurgical adverse events were attributable to errors in

21 Cf Troyen A. Brennan et al., Hospital CharacteristicsAssociated with Adverse
Events and Substandard Care, 265 JAMA 3265 (1991) (reporting these findings).
22 See id. at 3267 ("The only factor significantly associated with an increased percentage of [adverse events] due to negligence was a large proportion of discharged
minority patients.").
23 The authors note that diagnostic errors are the most difficult medical injuries
to detect and also the most likely to go uncompensated in a no-fault plan (p. 150).
24 Forty-seven percent of adverse events from diagnostic work-ups caused death
or permanent disability, compared with 35% serious disability for other non-surgical
adverse events (p. 54).
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medical management, one-half of which were deemed the result of
negligence. -5
The implications of the findings outlined in the third chapter
of the book are profound. In 1984, almost 100,000 injuries occurred during hospitalizations in New York and one-quarter of
those injuries were caused by negligence. If these results hold
true for the entire U.S. population, there would be approximately
150,000 deaths each year resulting from medical injuries, more
than one-half of which would be caused by negligence, 28 and approximately 30,000 people would suffer severe nonfatal injuries
due to medical treatment (p. 56).
Although the study reveals that "disproportionate numbers of
negligent injuries are inflicted on elderly and uninsured patients"
(p. 58), these same individuals are said to be less likely to file lawsuits. 2 7 Since a significant number of negligent medical injuries

are inflicted on those who are less apt to sue, the authors conclude
that malpractice litigation may not be a sufficient deterrent
against negligent care (p. 59). The researchers advocate, therefore, the development of "fail-safe systems" (p. 58) within the medical community to overcome human errors, such as the use of computers to prevent patients from receiving drugs to which they
have a known sensitivity.

IV. THE TORT GAP:

NEGLIGENT MEDICAL INJURIES THAT
NOT RESULT IN CLAIMS OR SUITS

Do

One justification offered for the proposals made by the
Harvard Medical Practice Study is that the current tort-based system for compensating medical injury claims has failed. "[Tlhe real
25 See Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients:Results of the HarvardMedical PracticeStudy II, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 377,
379-80 (1991) (asserting surgical errors were most common, followed by failure to
take preventive measures and diagnostic errors, respectively).
26 Although medical malpractice figures may exceed the annual death rate associated with motor vehicle and workplace accidents, the authors contend that many of
the individuals accounted for would have died from their medical conditions anyway

(p. 55).
27

See Mark Sager et al., Do The Elderly Sue Physicians?,150 ARcHIvEs op INTER-

NAL IED. 1091, 1093 (1990) (suggesting elderly are less likely to file malpractice suits

despite greater exposure to adverse events caused by negligence). But cf Edmond G.
Doherty & Carl 0. Haven, Medical Malpractice and Negligence: Sociodemographic
Characteristicsof Claimants and Nonclaimants, 238 JAMA 1656, 1657 (1977) (suggesting older patients of higher socioeconomic status are more apt to detect negative
medical experiences, and therefore, to make claim or bring suit).
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tort crisis may consist in too few claims," the authors assert (p.
62).28

Before arriving at this conclusion, the Harvard group reviewed a database of almost 68,000 medical malpractice claims
filed with New York insurers from 1975 through early 1989. The
authors' findings discredit an earlier study by the U.S. Government Accounting Office that reported the annual claims rate as
one for every three practicing physicians in the state. The
Harvard researchers found that in New York there were nine malpractice claims paid per 100 physicians for the year 1984 (p. 65),
ten percent of which were filed later than four years after the date
of the original injury. The annual frequency of malpractice claims
rose steadily from 3200 in 1976 to 5400 in 1984. The claims fied
against individual physicians, however, increased less dramatically because more claims were made against hospitals (p. 68). In
1984, the practice of bringing claims against multiple health care
providers for damages arising from a single incident emerged. As
a result, while only forty percent of claims arising from a single
incident resulted in payment, one-half of the patient claimants received money for their injuries because of the multiple claims they
asserted. (p. 68). In 1988, the average amount paid per successful
claim more than tripled and median payments were over seven
times their amount in 1976 (p. 68).29
Although almost one out of every eight doctors will be sued for
medical negligence each year, the authors conclude that only one
in every seven patients who suffered medical injury attributable
to negligence will file a malpractice action (p. 69). After comparing the information from the insurance database on claims made
in 1984 with the group's estimate of patients who suffered negligent medical injuries in that same year, the authors found that
nearly eighty percent of the negligently injured patients who did
not file a claim either fully recovered from their injuries within six
28 The California study and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
both found that for every 10 instances of medical negligence in California hospitals
only one medical malpractice claim was made in the California liability insurance
system (p. 62). Of the claims that were made, only 40% of patients ever received any
payment through the legal system (p. 62). Consequently, only 4% of the total number
of in-hospital torts in California resulted in compensation to the injured patient (p.
62).
29 The authors explain that the real value of claims tripled from 1976 to 1988, at
which time the average successful claimants were receiving about $225,000 for their
medical injuries (p. 68).
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months or were more than seventy years old when the injury occurred (p. 70).
Among the 151 hospitals involved in the Harvard study, only
forty-seven claims were filed by hospitalized patients, more than
one-half of which revealed evidence of either medical injury or
medical negligence (p. 71). Therefore, "[e]xpressed in the form of
ratios calculated from the sampling weights, the chances that a
claim would be filed by a patient with an identifiable negligent
injury was... only one in fifty" (p. 73).30 The authors believe that
this figure overstates the gap between instances of medical negligence and tort claims filed. In 1984, only about two percent of the
patients who suffered a negligent medical injury actually filed a
malpractice claim. The authors speculate that the probable ratio
of negligence to claims, which they consider to be the true tort
gap, is perhaps one in thirty. According to their estimates, there
were thirty potential claims for every one actually made and 15
potential claims for each one actually paid, "because almost all
valid claims made will eventually be paid" (p. 75).31 The authors
maintain that the financial and emotional burdens imposed on innocent physicians who are sued by patients with invalid claims,
combined with the tremendous gap between negligently inflicted
injuries and malpractice suits fied against health care providers,
clearly demonstrate a pressing need for comprehensive tort reform (pp. 75-76). Despite the fact that a large portion of this gap
consisted of only minor injuries where little or no financial loss
was suffered, there was still "several times as many seriously disabled patients who received no legal redress for their injuries as
innocent doctors who bore the burden of defending against unwarranted malpractice claims" (p. 76). The authors assert, therefore,
that the legislative effort should emphasize the creation of a legal
system that would be more accessible to victims of negligent medical treatment (p. 76).

30 Qf A. Russell Localio et aL, Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse
Events Due to Negligence, Results of the HarvardMedical PracticeStudy III, 325 NEv
ENG. J. MED. 245, 250 (1991) ("IT]he civil-justice system only infrequently compensates injured patients and rarely identifies and holds health care providers accountable for substandard medical care.").
31 See id. at 249 (positing reasons for this startling low ratio).
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V. EXPANDING REDRESS FOR MEDICAL INJURIES
BY REDUCING DAMAGES

In their attack on the legal system's failure to redress all negligent adverse events, the authors compared the benefits and costs
of malpractice litigation. They state that the "distribution of the
insurance dollar seems misplaced: at most only modest scheduled
benefits would be paid [under their proposal] for the nonfinancial
losses stemming from iatrogenic injuries" (p. 80). The authors further assert that under the proposed no-fault system, costs would
be reduced by excluding short-term disabilities from coverage and
only compensating long-lasting, severe disabilities. Moreover, the
additional costs attributable to medical injury would be paid only
after the first six months of disability.32 Prior to this time, payment of no-fault benefits would not be made, in order to avoid paying costs attributable to the background illness. 3 Furthermore,
the authors advocate a change in the method of compensating lawyers since proof of negligence would no longer be a component of
the system. Contingent fees, therefore, would no longer be cognizable as a method of attorney compensation. Rather, the authors
intimate that attorneys would be paid pursuant to a plan similar
to the one currently utilized in workers' compensation cases (p.
82).
The authors also assessed the financial feasibility of their proposal by estimating the losses for patients injured in 1984 and
projecting their calculations to cover the remainder of the patients' lives (p. 85). Wage losses, employer-paid fringe benefits,
and lost household production were accounted for in the estimation of lifetime losses that would be suffered by patients as a result of negligent medical treatment incurred in 1984 (pp. 85-87).
Patients hospitalized in New York incurred overall costs of $21.4
billion from their initial illnesses and medical injuries.34 Finan32 This six month ineligibility period would commence upon admission to the hospital because work-related sick leave payments and benefits from New York's temporary disability insurance plan would provide up to 20% of substitute income to disabled patients and their dependents (pp. 100-01).
33 The authors contend that after six months, social security disability benefits
would also become available for permanently and totally disabled patients; this ultimately would result in even greater savings for the no-fault system of compensation
(p. 81). Additionally, the authors believe that New York's general temporary disability law would adequately compensate injured patients for the initial six months. See
N.Y. WoRm COMP. LAw §§ 204-05 (McKinney 1993).
34 This figure was comprised of all the elements factored into the group's estimate
of projected lifetime losses suffered by patients due to negligent care (p. 92).
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cial losses caused by medical injury alone constituted only a small
proportion of the total costs while lost earnings comprised the
highest cost attributable to medical injury (pp. 95-96). Most of the
patients who experienced medical injuries had been employed
before hospitalization.3 5 Approximately ten percent of the patients either died in the hospital or soon after discharge. The most
severe economic losses due to medical injury were concentrated in
a small segment of the patient population, 3 6 and the largest component of total losses was due to the eighteen percent of injured
workers who died because of a medical injury.
As noted earlier, although negligent injuries comprised only
about one-quarter of the medical injuries, they were responsible
for nearly one-half of the severe to fatal ones. Not surprisingly,
the average economic losses suffered because of medical injury
were much higher among the patients afflicted with negligent injuries even though those injuries constituted such a large proportion of the fatal injuries, which did not involve any long term medical costs (p. 97).
To further bolster their assertion that the tort liability system
has failed, the authors point out that only about one-quarter of the
hospitalized patients studied were fully reimbursed for any loss of
wages they incurred after six months from the date of their admission. The other three-quarters incurred uncompensated losses
averaging $70,000 apiece. In fact, the researchers aver, those patients who actually brought suit incurred higher levels of economic loss than patients who did not sue and those who sued received lower ratios of compensation for their losses. The authors
assert that this finding strengthens their conclusion that "more
malpractice suits are brought by patients7 without rather than
with a negligent medical injury" (p. 101).3
Although they advocate a six-month waiting period before a
patient would become eligible for no-fault benefits, the authors
35 Fifteen percent of those who received medical injuries and were alive at discharge never returned to work, three-quarters of them due to ill health. Sixty-three
percent of the employees and 55% of the homemakers resumed their usual work
within six months after entering the hospital (p. 92).
36 Ninety percent of the lifetime wage losses were suffered by 21% of the workers,
and 99% of the lost household production fell on 22% of the homemakers (p. 96).
37 The authors found, however, that the legal system works effectively to separate
the good claims from the bad, even if it cannot prevent unmeritorious claims from
being filed. Additionally, the authors concluded that "the chances that any one doctor
will be sued are far greater if negligent treatment has occurred than if it has not" (p.
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claim their proposal would not have an upper limit on the compensation an injured patient could receive. 8 They recommend a sixmonth waiting period to benefit those patients with the most serious injuries. This would be accomplished by allowing a recuperation period designed to determine if the patient suffered a medical
injury or simply experienced the consequences of treatment.3 9
The authors believe their plan would have cost less (at $900
million) than their estimated cost of malpractice insurance for all
doctors and hospitals in New York in 1988 (over $1 billion) (p.
104). The authors fail, however, to include in the projected figures
for their proposal the expense of administering the program.4 °
Nevertheless, they state the current malpractice system spends
approximately fifty-five percent of every claims dollar on "legal administration" rather than on direct payment to victims (p. 106).
One source of savings, the authors assert, would result from "the
absence of litigation over the defendant's fault: reliance [would
be] placed on a less-formal administrative determination of what
caused the victim's injury" (p. 106). As an example, the authors
point to the much lower administrative costs (twenty percent) associated with workers' compensation claims. 4 '
The savings the authors seek to achieve by eliminating compensation for pain and suffering, which the authors contend presently accounts for fifty percent of the amount of tort awards (pp.
106-07), represents a dramatic departure from the author's paradigm, the Swedish plan, which not only pays "up to 100% for economic loss... [but also] sixty-eight percent... for non-economic
losses."42 Despite the omission of pain and suffering losses from
their analysis, the authors attempt "to determine the potential
38 Later in the book, however, the authors recommend a cap on wage losses of "80
percent of net lost earnings up to 200 percent of the state's average earnings level" (p.
151).
39 In an apparent concession to those who believe a six-month waiting period
would operate as an undue hardship, the authors state that a two-month waiting
period would be an acceptable compromise (pp. 102-03).
40 The "substantial additional allowance [that] must be made for the cost of administration" of the authors' plan is not included (p. 106).
41 But see Williams G. Johnson et al., The Economic Consequences of Medical Injuries, Implications for a No-Fault Insurance Plan, 267 JAMA 2487, 2492 (1992)
("With such an addition for administrative costs... the ...figure [almost $900 million] stated earlier could reach to $1.5 billion, even with a 6-month deductible in
place.").
42 ROSENTHAL, supra note 8, at 176-77; see also Walter Gellhorn, Medical MalpracticeLitigation(U.S.)-Medical Mishap Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CoaNEa L. REv.
170, 194 (1988) (finding New Zealand's no-fault system pays lump-sums of up to
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costs of a scheduled financial benefit for impairment of normal enjoyment of life" (pp. 107-08).
The authors would accomplish additional savings by having
the plan function as a "secondary payor to direct health care insurance" (p. 107).43 They claim that as an alternative to litigation,
the plan would reduce costs by eliminating the expense and delay
associated with judicial determinations of causation (p. 108). Furthermore, they see the supplementary function of the plan as compatible with the increasing use of collateral source statutes, which
reduce tort awards by the amount of first-party insurance benefits
received by the plaintiff.
The authors' calculated savings are arguably flawed. For instance, they fail to discuss the impact of subrogation and reimbursement rights that are commonplace in most health insurance
contracts.4 The authors admit, however, that if Medicare and
Medicaid refuse to waive their present reimbursement scheme for
payments made to tort victims who are covered by no-fault compensation, then the cost of the no-fault plan would increase by an
estimated $250 million (p. 108). If a benefit is added for pain and
suffering, the cost would become almost double the current expense for medical malpractice insurance. The authors, however,
believe the added costs would be offset by the previous over-calculation in costs and a lower number of actual claims than is
estimated.45
$17,000 for non-economic loss to individuals who suffer permanent loss or impairment
of bodily functions and up to $10,000 for pain and suffering).
43 The authors contend this factor is a major source of savings in cost estimates
for no-fault compensation because health insurance covers 80% of medical expenses
and disability insurance covers 20% of long-term lost earnings (p. 108).
44 See generally 44 Aiu. Jun. 2D Insurance §§ 1794, 1815 (1982) (discussing
subrogation).
45 First, the authors offset the cost of pain and suffering with their calculation of
benefits payable for lost household production (p. 108). They valued these benefits at
the full earnings lost and projected the amounts over the life expectancy of the injured
patient (p. 108). If there were any doubts, and there often were, they presumed that
injury rather than illness was the source of a given disability (p. 105). But the authors now assert that a lower estimate is more realistic (p. 108). Second, the authors
argue that since their no-fault plan is premised on compensation for all patient injuries and losses, the actual cost would be less than the proposed cost because a considerable number of valid claims are never filed (pp. 108-09). The authors attribute this
nonassertion of claims to the inability of patients to identify medical treatment as the
cause of their disabilities (p. 109).
It is ironic that the authors seek to encourage acceptance of their plan by acknowledging that it will function to inequitably exclude those patients it is intended
to include. These patients are presumably victims of misdiagnosis, where it is even
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The researchers further claim that no-fault is superior to the
current tort system because of the sizeable gap between negligent
injuries that result in the filing of a suit and those upon which no
suit is brought (p. 147). Even if the gap did not exist, they argue,
tort claims provide remedies for only a small fraction of medical
injury victims-those whose injuries were caused by negligence
(p. 6). The researchers suggest that an alternative to the current
system of malpractice litigation is needed to prevent another precipitous increase in medical malpractice liability insurance premiums (pp. 1-2). However, no empirical data are cited to substantiate this assertion.
VI. TiE

DETERRENT EFFECT OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
LITIGATION

The Harvard group surveyed New York doctors to find out the
way they reacted to the threat of suit and to determine the deterrent effect of malpractice litigation. Case records were reviewed
to see whether tort suits resulted in fewer patient injuries. The
authors preface this part of the study with an expression of doubt
about the effectiveness of the tort system in fulfilling its role as a
deterrent. They question whether the types of incidents in which
tort remedies are applied can be effectively deterred, since the
likelihood of a lawsuit is remote even in instances in which medical negligence has occurred. They point out that "in terms of absolute numbers more claims are filed against careful than against
careless doctors" (p. 115). In addition, the protection provided by
malpractice insurance prevents a direct financial deterrent effect
from being imposed on negligent doctors because premiums have
not been based on experience-rating, as is the case in the workers'
compensation fields. Even if they were, the authors argue, malpractice claims are only an occasional event in the careers of most
physicians, unlike workers' compensation, under which many
claims are fied annually and a merit rating system functions
more effectively. They add:
This critique is not directed against liability insurance itself:
That institution serves to protect the doctor from possibly crushing damages as a result of a momentary inadvertent mishap and
more difficult to ascertain whether an adverse event has occurred. This conflicts with
the authors' assertion that physicians might help to identify iatrogenic injuries that
will constitute valid claims (see p. 145).
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also guarantees that the patient who has been hurt will find a
source of funds to pay the damage verdict won in the courtroom.
buffer does re(p. 114). They believe, however, that the insurance
46
duce the deterrent effect of the tort system.
The first part of the study, focusing on deterrence, surveyed
the views of New York physicians on the effects of malpractice litigation generally, and on the risk of being sued and bearing the
costs and consequences of such litigation (pp. 117-31).11
46 The authors do not suggest that the existence of any insurance scheme necessarily deprives the insured of incentives to act cautiously (p. 114). Instead, the cost of
insurance premiums could be pegged to the number of claims brought against an insured in the past (pp. 114-15). The use of this so-called "experience rating" would
incorporate the deterrent effect in the insurance system and encourage careful medical practice. Such a program has been successfully used in fields such as workers'
compensation but has not been applied to medical malpractice claims because such
claims are less frequently asserted against individual physicians (pp. 114-15).
47 The two methods used to gather data were written questionnaires and personal interviews (p. 117). The questionnaires were sent to a large population of doctors who were differentiated by the following criteria: practice specialty, geographic
location and claims history (p. 117). The specialties studied were ranked according to
risk. Internal medicine and associated fields were considered low risk; general surgery and associated specialties were deemed medium risk; and orthopedic surgeons,
neurosurgeons and obstetricians were deemed high risk (p. 117). The geographic areas of New York from which the doctors were drawn included Long Island and upstate
counties. The doctors were divided into two groups for claims history information:
those who had a claim filed against them since 1975 and those who had not (pp. 117-

18).
Of the 1823 questionnaires sent, only 739 were completed and returned, which
amounted to a 41% response rate (p. 118). The respondents tended to be older, male
(92%), board certified (65%) graduates of U.S. medical schools (73%) who had been
sued for malpractice at least once since 1975 (55%) (p. 118).
The information sought from the doctors fell into four categories. The first was
the subjects' estimate of the risk of suit (p. 118). This estimate was compared with
information gathered on claims which were actually filed in order to obtain a true risk
of suit. Next, the physicians were asked about the expenses they incurred in malpractice suits, such as days lost from medical practice, out-of-pocket expenses for personal
counsel and direct payments not covered by liability insurance (p. 118). Third, the
doctors were questioned about variations in their practice methods over the last 10
years. In particular, they were asked whether they ordered more tests, spent additional time explaining to patients the risks of treatment, allocated greater time to
maintaining detailed paperwork or saw fewer patients as a result of the risk of suit
(pp. 118-19). Finally, the subjects were asked to compare the effects of malpractice
litigation on the maintenance or enhancement of quality medical care with those of
other quality assurance methods such as peer pressure, review of medical journals, or
continuing medical education (p. 119).
The subsequent personal interviews yielded qualitative data to supplement the
results of the questionnaire distribution. Ninety-minute interviews were conducted
with 47 doctors who responded to the questionnaires (p. 119). They had been questioned about their observations of the impact of litigation on their practice, their feelings toward quality assurance programs and, if they had been sued, their beliefs as to
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The second part of the deterrence aspect of the study sought
to determine whether the threat of litigation resulted in safer
medical care.48 The physician survey indicated that although
fewer medical malpractice suits are brought than the doctors estimated, the inflated prospect of litigation exerted a deterrent effect
on the provision of negligent medical care by physicians (pp. 12426). The doctors surveyed also overestimated the risk that malpractice claims will be brought against them. 49 However,
although they overstated the danger of claims and suits, they underestimated the risk that a physician will negligently injure a
patient 50
The financial cost of lost earnings and legal expenses incurred
by physicians presents another deterrent, even though a physician has malpractice coverage. 5 1 However, the financial burden is
why they had been sued. Furthermore, the physicians were presented with patient
disability scenarios, which varied in their degree of adverse events and negligent adverse events, to ascertain their attitudes toward issues of causation and negligence (p.

119). See also Ann G. Lawthers et al., PhysiciansPerceptions of the Risk of Being
Sued, 17 J. HEALTIi POL., PoL'Y AND L. 463 (1992) (discussing this part of study

further).
48 The study group used data drawn from the previous study of medical injuries,
claims reports filed with insurance companies and litigation information from the
hospitals (p. 120). Claims filed in 1983 were reviewed to determine whether they

influenced treatment practices and patient injury rates in 1984 (p. 121). Studying
27,574 admissions in 49 hospitals, the authors identified 843 adverse events, 189 of
which were found to be due to negligence. They used this data to ascertain the likelihood of negligent injury per iatrogenic injury (pp. 121-22). The study group then used
the data on injury and litigation rates to discern the rate of claims per negligent injury (p. 122). This final rate was intended to test the assumption that under the tort
system a higher rate of malpractice claims translated into a lower rate of negligent
medical injuries suffered. If that premise stood true at the end of their study, it would
demonstrate the deterrent effect of the tort system (pp. 73-76).
49 The doctors surveyed overestimated the annual number of malpractice claims
by approximately three times its true rate (p. 124). Physicians in the lower risk specialties and geographic regions in upstate New York made greater overestimations
than those in the higher risk specialties and regions in downstate New York. Furthermore, when asked about the likelihood of a lawsuit arising from patient injury
and physician negligence, the former group of doctors believed that 45% of adverse
events and 60% of negligent adverse events led to malpractice claims, when actually
13% of negligent injuries and less than 4% of both negligent and non-negligent injuries produced actual claims (p. 125).
50 The doctors surveyed overestimated the number of suits per iatrogenic injury
by 10 times. The authors attribute this excess, in part, to the pronounced reluctance
of doctors to label treatment decisions as negligent (p. 125).
51 Physicians who were sued lost a median of three to five work days per malpractice case, with an overall average of six days (p. 126). Since at the time of the study,
doctors in New York earned an average of $1,100 a day, they lost approximately
$7,000 per claim. Moreover, out-of-pocket expenses increased the cost of litigation for
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considered small compared to the emotional trauma involved in a
public legal attack upon a physician's performance and competence (p. 126).
The survey also revealed the impact malpractice litigation
has had on the medical profession. The threat of legal proceedings
increased the likelihood that doctors would order more tests, reduce the number of patients seen, and limit the types of procedures undertaken. Yet doctors denied that litigation has a strong
influence on improving the quality of medical care (p. 126).
Rather, they reported that continuing medical education, the review of medical journals, and peer group discussions had a greater
influence than litigation in improving the quality of medical care
(pp. 127-28). Moreover, the increased time spent on paperwork
was seen by the authors to be a result of heightened patient care
regulation by hospitals, insurers, and government agencies (p.
127).
The conclusion reached by the authors in the second part of
the study is that malpractice litigation has a deterrent effect on
patient injuries (p. 129). The authors found that tort litigation
reduces both the negligent injury rate and the combined negligent
and non-negligent injury rate.52 However, the authors believe
several problems with their findings5" warrant their rejection as a
basis for policy making. 54 Nonetheless, the authors' determinathose doctors who hired private counsel and for those who paid their own money to
settle claims (p. 126).
52 The rate of negligent injury of 0.89% of admissions rose to 1.25% of admissions
if there were no medical malpractice claims brought. The overall injury rate (negligent and non-negligent alike) of 3.3% of hospital admissions rose to 3.7% without
medical malpractice claims activity. Thus, the level of tort litigation reduced the negligent medical injury rate by 29%(from 1.25% to 0.89%) and the overall negligent and
non-negligent medical injury rate by 11% (from 3.7% to 3.3%) (p. 131).
53 First, the authors qualify their findings by stating that they lacked a sufficiently large body of data to satisfy statistical standards of proof (p. 129). They expressed concern that their presented correlation might be coincidental rather than
causal. The authors contend the great public interest involved and the absence of
evidence to the contrary justify the assumption that the results are sufficiently valid
to initiate practical policy-making to address this urgent problem (p. 131). Second,
the authors acknowledge that the impact of tort claims on medical injuries may be
greater than they estimated since they used injury statistics from several hospitals
with minimal claims exposure (p. 132). These hospitals and the doctors employed
there had a lower than average risk of being sued (p. 132).
54 First, the authors denounce the findings because they fail to scientifically determine "the overall social cost" (p. 133) of obtaining the injury prevention effect. Interestingly enough, they did not express a corresponding concern over their inability
to determine the overall social costs of abandoning the current tort system.
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tion that malpractice litigation changes doctors' behavior has considerable merit. Although health care costs may rise because of
increased defensive testing and procedures, there are notable benefits such as the measures taken to prevent injuries and the
greater amount of time spent with patients to discuss treatment
options (pp. 133-34).
As a further step, the authors sought to determine the optimal mix of increased tort prevention and increased medical expense. They applied the so-called "Danzon test," which maintains
that the tort system would pay for itself if it reduced negligent
injury rates by twenty percent or more." Since the authors estimate that negligent injuries are reduced by twenty-nine percent
(p. 131), tort litigation meets the test, particularly since the injury
prevention estimates in the study are low (p. 134).
VII. THE

PROPOSAL: ENACTMENT OF A VOLUNTARY No-FAULT
THE PATIENT TO CHOOSE-

PLAN, OSTENSIBLY wrrH

TORT OR NO-FAULT
"[Slpiraling and excessive levels of litigation and damage
awards" (p. 136) have the medical profession clamoring for the reform of medical malpractice litigation. 56 The Harvard group conSecond, setting aside cost considerations, the authors could not demonstrate that
the current system prevents more injuries than other forms of medical liability (p.
133). In fact, similar studies in the area of automobile insurance have indicated that
a no-fault compensation scheme increases the number of total accidents. See Elisa-

beth M. Landes, Insurance,Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and EmpiricalInvestigation of the Effect of No-FaultAccidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 61-62 (1982) (discussing that no-fault insurance produces "both an economically and statistically
significant increase in fatal accidents").
55 See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 226 (1985). This test is based on the premise that increased litigation
expenses are justified only if there is a proportional increase in deterrence benefits.
Id. Employing a 1974 estimate that 10% of negligent accidents result in a claim and
4% of these result in compensation, the author concluded that a 4% reduction in the
rate of negligent injury would justify the costs of the tort system. Id. From this, the
author concludes that a 20% decrease in the negligent injury rate is required to justify
malpractice litigation. Id.
56 State legislatures have been pressured to make it more difficult to bring medical malpractice claims, to win them, and to be fully compensated (p. 136).
Other proposals have been even more draconian. A plan devised by the American
Medical Association ("AMA") would take medical malpractice cases away from juries
and judges entirely and have them decided administratively as part of the medical
disciplinary process. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 114-32
(1991) (discussing AMA's plan); Brennan, supra note 8, at 451-55 (discussing benefits
and problems of AMA's plan). Private contracts entered into by doctors and patients
have been advocated as a means of by-passing the judicial process and resolving tort
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cedes that the basis for the current pressure for malpractice reform-the contention that litigation rates are rising
precipitously-is in reality a myth (p. 137). Their study demonstrates that "the underlying assumption that too many groundless
malpractice suits are initiated is unfounded" (p. 137).
Sharing this view, the authors are critical of the tort system
because "[nlot too many, but rather too few suits were brought for

5
the negligent medical injuries inflicted on patients" (p. 139). 7

They argue that since only a minority of the claims filed are based
on negligence, most cases are needlessly swept into the tort system. Moreover, they asserted that malpractice litigation does
not fully compensate injured parties because a large part of the
money recovered is spent on paying attorney's fees, reimbursing
financial expenses already covered by other insurance, and compensating the patient for pain and suffering experienced in earlier
59
years.

As an alternative to the tort system in the health care field,
the authors support the use of a model based on workers' compensation plans (p. 145). Strict liability would be imposed on hospitals for injuries to patients that are proven to result from medical
liability (p. 136). The proposal ultimately espoused by the authors of this book is a nofault plan to compensate all victims of medical injury, regardless of whether the injury resulted from negligence (p. 145). This approach has been adopted in Sweden
and New Zealand, and the authors use the two plans as examples of the potential for
the success of no-fault in this country.
57 According to study findings, one malpractice suit was filed in New York for
every 7.5 patients who suffered a true negligent injury (p. 139). Approximately one
out of two tort claims were ultimately paid. This translates into one paid malpractice
claim for every 15 negligent injuries inflicted in hospitals. If one were to focus on
claims involving serious injury to patients under 70 years of age, the ratio is more
dramatic at one claim paid for every three negligent injuries (p. 139).
58 However, the authors acknowledge that once a case had been filed, discovery
procedures permit patients and their attorneys to make more accurate judgments
about the merits of their claims (p. 140). One report cited by the authors confirms the
ability of malpractice litigation to filter out bad claims and to award damages, Henry
S. Farber and Michelle J. White, MedicalMalpractice:AnEmpiricalStudy ofthe Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. EcoN. 199 (1991). See Mark A. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standardof Careand Severity of Injury on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 782 (1992) (stating that in medical
malpractice cases studied, "our data suggests [sic] that inappropriate payments are
probably uncommon"). The study group, however, still criticizes the discovery process
because it creates a "sizeable financial and emotional burden on doctors and their
insurers simply by sweeping them into lawsuits that arose on account of mistaken
judgments made by patients' lawyers" (p. 140).
69 The authors assert that if justice demands that insurance money be used for
the pressing needs of the victims, the tort system seems to fail (pp. 141-42).
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care (p. 19). This system would compensate only tangible financial losses-"the types of loss that insurance theory and practice
demonstrate are best suited for such redress" (p. 145). The authors disparage the current system's purported tendency to award
damages for "virtually all imaginable forms of pain and suffering"
(p. 145). The compensation scheme they envision would cover
only medical injury victims with long-term disabilities who are not
protected from "catastrophic losses" (p. 145) by other forms of
medical or disability insurance. "In this respect, the system would
function analogously to the collateral source offset provision that
has now emerged in the malpractice regimes in a number of
states, including New York" (p. 145). Instead of investing a great
deal of time and money to determine culpability, the plan's compensatory mechanism would be triggered by proof that a patient's
injury was medically caused. 60 The proposed system would use
either self-insurance or experience-rated insurance, both of which
would directly link medical injuries to physician costs (p. 148).61
The Harvard group, however, anticipates several major
problems with the no-fault approach. First, they expect more
marginal claims and, therefore, higher costs because the need to
prove negligence would no longer exist (p.149). Second, the authors admit that pure no-fault compensation for medical injury is
not possible because identifying one essential category of medical
injury-those caused by failure to diagnose or to recommend
proper treatment-often depends on whether the physician took
appropriate steps during diagnosis and treatment (pp. 149-50). A
third concern is that hospitals, instead of adopting more precautionary measures, will simply turn away high-risk patients rather
than risk liability for all injuries (p. 150). As a prelude to adopting
a no-fault compensation scheme, the authors advocate an elective
approach because it would permit a study of the way the plan operates before it is mandated in all institutions (p. 151). Under an
elective approach, the no-fault plan could be compared with the
60 The authors optimistically suggest that physicians might help in making the
determination of whether an injury was iatrogenic (p. 145). This notion of a mutually
beneficial relationship between physician and patient already exists in Sweden,
where it is reported that doctors frequently encourage patients to file claims and help
complete forms. See Brennan, supra note 8, at 457 n.132 (discussing administration
of no-fault plan in Sweden).
61 Proponents of the plan argue that imposition of liability for a substantial
number of small awards on a health care institution where an injury has taken place,
rather than holding individual doctors responsible, would do more to prevent medical
injuries than would use of a non-merit rated insurance scheme (p. 148).
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coexisting tort62 system to determine the advantages and disadvantages of both.

To implement the elective no-fault compensation scheme, the
authors recommend that states begin by enacting a statute authorizing hospitals and health care organizations to offer patients
administrative compensation for medical injuries in return for a
waiver of tort liability. Patients would be informed of the tort
rights they would surrender and the no-fault benefits they would
receive. The legislation would mandate that benefits include outof-pocket medical expenses, eighty percent of net lost earnings (up
to 200% of the state's average earnings level) and "specified payments for loss of enjoyment of life associated with certain physical
impairments" (p. 151). The legislation would impose standard filing procedures to ensure accessibility, neutrality, and due process,
and would mandate the creation of effective quality assurance programs for participating hospitals to establish, among other things,
accountability for medical injuries.63
VIII. PIPE DREMS?
In a sweeping attack, the New York State Bar Association offered a comprehensive critique of the Harvard group's study.64
The most damning criticism leveled by the bar association report
was that no-fault would marginally increase the number of injured patients entitled to compensation by drastically restricting
the amounts recoverable. Even then the expense of no-fault would
far exceed what is spent under the tort system. One of the authors of the Harvard study has acknowledged elsewhere that nofault would be more expensive. 5
The authors have not made a persuasive case for no-fault
medical injury compensation. Few doctors can be expected to support the plan, since under it they become guarantors against any
number of unfortunate happenstances that can occur in the non62 "That last value is especially important for those who believe, as we do, that
governments should know something about the real world of medical injury and malpractice litigation before they enact reforms that profoundly affect the fates of patients, doctors, and lawyers for decades to come" (p. 152.).
63 Hospital peer review committees would be immune from antitrust laws and
thus free to suspend the practice privileges of careless physicians (p. 151).
64 See Maxwell J. MehIman, Saying 2Vo' to No-Fault:What the HarvardMalpractice Study Means ForMedical MalpracticeReform, in N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N., SPECIAL

COMNTrEE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

(Jan. 1991).

Brennan, supra note 8, at 458 ("No-fault would undoubtedly cost more than
torts ... ").
65
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negligent treatment of patients. Under the authors' plan, insurance premiums would be based on the number of adverse events
among a health care provider's patients. Thus, doctors and hospitals will be tempted to turn down critically ill patients whose medical conditions involve riskier and more intensive treatment. This
is so because doctors and hospitals cannot avoid the danger of a
non-negligent accident occurring in their care. There is a significant risk, therefore, that they will be subjected to higher insurance premiums and closer scrutiny by peer review and accreditation committees.
Under the scheme proposed in the Harvard study, hospitals
would present entering patients with a contract requiring them to
choose between no-fault or tort in the event a medical injury occurs. Such a scheme is impracticable for several reasons. First,
this type of contract would rapidly deteriorate into one of adhesion. Second, few patients would fully understand the choice they
were making. Third, given the restrictions that would be necessarily placed on eligibility for benefits, many patients choosing nofault would find themselves ineligible for recovery in the event
they suffered medical injury. Yet they would have waived their
option to pursue a remedy under the tort system.
Aside from the impracticability of the no-fault system, the authors also overstate the failings of the tort system. For example,
they contend that medical malpractice insurance rating methods
do not take claims history into consideration, and that even if an
experience-rating system were used, there would be no significant
change in the level of insurance premiums paid by doctors. The
empirical evidence, however, supports a contrary conclusion. 66 In
fact, the medical profession itself resisted implementation of experience rating, 67 and most states, including New York,6" now require insurance companies to use merit rating for physicians.
The authors spent almost $4 million to produce their report,
submitted more than a year late, to justify their recommendations
for a no-fault plan. Their medical data are useful in the continuing debate over health care, but their theoretical discussion on the
66 See C. E. Phelps, Experience Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance, in
INSTrrUTE FOR CIvIL JUSTICE, P-5877-1, (June 1978); J. E. Rolph, Some Statistical Evidence on Merit Ratingin MedicalMalpracticeInsurance,in RAND, INsTrrUTE
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, N-1725-HHC (June 1981).
67 See Patricia Munch, Causes of the Medical MalpracticeInsuranceCrisis: Risks

RAND,

and Regulations, RAND, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, P-5766 (Dec. 1976).
68 N.Y. INS. LAW § 2343(d) (McKinney Supp. 1995).
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merits of the two systems of compensation is too narrow. For instance, the authors' dismissal of the tort system as a meaningless
remedy is cursory and omits much of the data that show the tort
system functions fairly effectively. In addition, the authors devote
little attention to proposals that would make the tort system more
responsive, streamline access to the courts, or make courts less
expensive to utilize. For instance, although the authors conclude
that screening panels do little to aid the tort system in functioning
effectively (pp. 8-10), they do not advocate the repeal of laws requiring presuit panel review. They decry the long delay between
the time of injury and resolution of claim (p. 5), yet there is no
mention of feasible means for shortening this delay.
The medical profession is generally seen as having a "circle
the wagons" mentality when it comes to malpractice suits, with
stone-walling and nondisclosure suggested as means of preventing
cases from being pursued.6 9 The book reinforces that perception
by noting that hospitals participating in the study insisted that
patients not be advised whether an accident had occurred or
whether a negligent injury had been inflicted. 70 Furthermore, the
authors' recommendations have come at an inopportune time,
since insurance premiums seem to be leveling off from the dramatic increases of the 1970s and 80s.71

69 See Nathan P. Couch, et al, The High Cost of Low-Frequency Events: The
Anatomy and Economics of SurgicalMishaps, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED. 634 (1981).
The forces that could help to reveal and control epidemiologic sources of error tend to go into hiding when a malpractice suit or an adverse judgment in
a malpractice suit is the only known outcome of a search for the cause of
error. If we are to neutralize the pernicious and stifling influence of mal-

practice litigation, we must find an acceptable legal safeguard.
Id. at 637.
70 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. But see Troyen A. Brennan, Ethics of
Confidentiality: The Special Care of Quality Assurance Research, 38 CLINICAL REs.
551 (1990). Brennan concludes that "[tihe goal of better quality care is best served by
limiting litigants' access to ... [research] records." Id. at 556.
71 See Brian McCormick, '93 Insurance Rates Seen as Stable, AMmRCAN MEDICAL
NEws, June 21, 1993, at 22 (noting data released by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. indicate frequency of malpractice claims decreased from 14.3 per 100 physicians in 1992); see also Milt Freudenheim, Dealing in Myths on Malpractice, N.Y.
Tirs, Oct. 13, 1992, at D2 (stating claims decreased from 17.9% in 1985 to 13.9% in
1991). Although the New York State Superintendent of Insurance approved a 14%
increase in malpractice insurance rates in 1993, this was the first increase after four
years of declining rates. Kevin Sack, Rise Granted on Insurancefor Doctors, N.Y.
TiprEs, July 27, 1993, at B1, B6.
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CONCLUSION

The authors do not demonstrate a willingness to consider the
tort system as part of a broader network for compensating the victims of injuries. Every negligent medical injury that did not result in a claim is seen by them as a failure of the tort system,
rather than simply an exercise of independent choice by the injured patient. At its core, the no-fault proposal espoused by Professor Weiler and his colleagues can be seen more as a reflection of
the medical profession's desire for autonomy, free from hectoring
lawyers, uncomprehending juries, and burdensome insurance premiums, than as a plan for equitable patient compensation, improved accident deterrence, and quality medical care. Although
the tort system clearly has its faults, the authors did not give it its
day in court, and have not effectively compared the merits of the
two systems.
In a report on an earlier study of why people forego their right
to sue for medical negligence, another researcher mused:
[W]e may have inaccurately or incompletely characterized the
malpractice crisis. The crisis may be the high level of iatrogenic
illness or injury for which people receive no compensation. Or it
may be a crisis of confidence and credibility of physicians and
health care institutions. Or the crisis may be that personality or
attitudinal barriers prevent the "right" cases (those which involve the most egregious errors or the most serious and enduring
consequences) from coming to trial, while those which have less
serious consequences do. Whatever the crisis or crises of medical
malpractice and malpractice insurance, there is no evidence from
these data that it is a crisis
of consumers' or lawyers' avarice,
72
vindictiveness, or greed.

It seems the authors of this book would not agree with Dr.
Meyers' position, since the implicit slant of their book is to the
contrary, and their proposal is weighted heavily against lawyers
and the tort system. In the final analysis, it does not favor either
the providers or the consumers of medical services. The Harvard
Medical Practice Study has yielded information that will help fuel
the health care debate, but the plan for a no-fault alternative
should be rejected. No-fault, in New York or elsewhere in the

72 Allen R. Meyers, Lumping It': The Hidden Denominatorof the Medical Malpractice Crisis,77 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1544, 1547 (1987).
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United States, cannot effectively replace the tort system without
enormous disruption, expense, and, perhaps worst of all, inequities. Despite the scholarly work done by the authors, no-fault
medical injury compensation should remain a pipe dream.

